Kant's Critique of Pure Reason....

[Eddier1]

Suki.A blast of heat for you in the cold of January....con mucha VIDA!! [/b][/quote]

Brrrr...presently Suki it is 9 degees below zero here.

However, as a study aid to go along with your new book by Kant, the following is excellent, IMHO. It is a brief biography of Kant, and has an extensive bibliography which is excellent, IMHO.

Kant, Immanuel
{kahnt, i-mahn'-oo-el}
A pivotal force in the history of philosophy, the German philosopher Immanuel Kant, b. Apr. 22, 1724, d. Feb. 12, 1804, radically altered the nature of philosophic inquiry. Kant was born in Konigsberg, East Prussia, to lower-middle-class parents who were devout pietists (see PIETISM). At the age of 8 he entered the Collegium Fridiricianum, a pietistic Latin school; he remained there for 8 1/2 years and then entered the University of Konigsberg in 1740 to study theology and, subsequently, natural science and philosophy. While at the university he was greatly influenced by a follower of Christian Wolff, the German rationalist. He also read the works of Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz and Isaac Newton. Other important influences on Kant's later thought were the writings of David Hume and Jean Jacques Rousseau. The death of his father forced him to interrupt his studies, and he became a tutor for private families from 1746 to 1755. In 1755 he returned to the University of Konigsberg, where he remained for the rest of his life. In 1756 he was granted a degree and made a lecturer, and in 1770 he was appointed a professor.
Pre-Critical Period (1755-81)
By 1755, Kant had written Principiorum Primorum Cognitiones Metaphysicae Nova Dilucidato (The First Principles of Metaphysical Knowledge), which was somewhat critical of the Leibnizian philosophy, and The General Natural History of the Heavens (Eng. trans., 1900), in which he employed Newtonian laws to formulate the Kant-LaPlace hypothesis of the origin of the solar system. In this period his works were primarily scientific, but some contained discussions of methodology. For example, in 1756 he published Physical Monadology (Eng. trans., 1928), which contrasted Leibnizian with Newtonian ways of thinking and introduced the distinction between things-in-themselves and things-as-they-appear.
In his writings during the 1760s he was explicitly critical of the Leibnizian-Wolffian philosophy. In 1763, in An Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy (Eng. trans., 1911), he argued that some physical relations, such as causality, cannot be reduced to logical relations, and in Enquiry into the Proofs for the Existence of God (1763; Eng. trans., 1836), he rejected Rene Descartes's attempt to prove existence by logic. In Inquiry into the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals (1764; Eng. trans., 1949), he directly attacked the Leibnizian methodology of modeling philosophy solely on the deductive method. Kant's inaugural dissertation, The Forms and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible Worlds (1770; Eng. trans., 1928), marked a complete breach with the Leibnizian metaphysics.
Critical Period (1781-90)
Between 1770 and 1781, Kant published very little. Between 1781 and 1790, however, he produced his most important works, representing the full development of his critical powers. In 1781 he published the CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON (Eng. trans., 1838), his most famous work. It is divided into two major parts: "The Transcendental Doctrine of the Elements," which deals with the sources of human knowledge, and the "Transcendental Doctrine of Method," which deals with the proper and improper uses of reason. Kant used the word transcendental to designate that method which examines the necessary but nonempirical conditions of knowledge. In 1785 he published The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals (Eng. trans., 1969) and, in 1787, The Critique of Practical Reason (Eng. trans., 1949), both of which examine moral philosophy. The third critique, The Critique of Judgment (1790; Eng. trans., 1895), deals with aesthetic and teleologic, or purposive, judgments. During this period Kant also published seven other major works.
Philosophy
From Kant's point of view, the philosophical traditions of both EMPIRICISM and RATIONALISM had reached a "dark, confused, and useless" dead end. What he proposed was a radical, new synthesis in which he would incorporate both experience and reason without falling into the skepticism of the empirical school or the vast, unverifiable metaphysical structure of the rationalist school. The problem of knowledge, as he saw it, was how to connect the "is" of sense experience with the "must" of necessary and universal truth. His starting point was the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments. An analytic judgment is one in which the predicate is contained in the subject--for instance, "Triangles have three sides." The truth of such a judgment can be known by an analysis of the subject. A synthetic judgment is one in which the predicate adds to or expands the subject--for instance, "Triangles were the earliest figures to be discovered in geometry." The truth of such a statement cannot be known through an analysis of the subject.
Kant also distinguished two ways in which judgments can be known: something is known a priori if it is neither derived from nor testable by sense experience; it is known a posteriori if it is derived from or testable by experience. Philosophers before Kant had held that analytic judgments were known a priori and that synthetic judgments were known a posteriori. Analytic a priori judgments were always and necessarily true--but true only about the meaning and relations of words, not about the world. Synthetic a posteriori judgments, on the other hand, were about the world--but they could only be contingent or probable truths. This meant that we could have no certain knowledge about experience, and Kant believed that we had such knowledge. Thus he formulated this problem: "How are synthetic a priori judgments possible?" His solution, in essence, was that experience provides the content (the synthetic element) and the mind provides the structure (the a priori element) that determines the way in which the content will be organized and understood.
Kant calls the contribution of the mind a "category." He distinguishes four groups of categories by which the contents of experience are ordered: quantity, quality, relation, and modality. Examples of specific categories within these groups are space, time, causality, and substance. These categories are contentless and only prescribe the structure for objects of possible experience. Space, for example, is not something external to us but a structure in the mind that relates objects to one another. The active contribution of the mind gives meaning to the external material of experience. Whether things really are the way they appear to us is something we can never know, for all our knowledge comes prestructured through the filter of the mind. This is the basis for Kant's famous distinction between the unknowable NOUMENON, or thing-in-itself, and the PHENOMENON, or thing-as-it-appears.
Kant held that synthetic a priori judgments were possible in mathematics and physics but not in metaphysics. Thus he thought it a mistake for metaphysicians to attempt to go beyond sense experience in order to define concepts like God, freedom, or the immortal soul. All theoretical knowledge consists in applying the categories to perceptual material located in space and time, and these concepts lie outside the spatiotemporal categories. Such ideas have, for Kant, an indispensable function. Whereas most concepts have a "constitutive" function (they classify experience), concepts like God, freedom, or soul have a "regulative" function: they guide us toward certain goals useful for science and ethics. They are held "as if" they were true.
In the moral sphere Kant says that he has denied knowledge to make room for faith. Because moral law cannot be justified by reason it can only be obeyed for its own sake. Kant's ethical theory thus rests on the concept of duty. A good person acts out of duty, not because he or she fears punishment or hopes for reward or happiness, but only because it is his or her duty. Like other concepts, moral laws are only mental structures, so the primary moral law will be a contentless form of judgment that can be applied universally; Kant calls this the CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE. The categorical imperative states that a person should "act in such a way that it is possible for one to will that the maxim of one's action should become a universal law." Kant gives the example of someone who borrows money, promises to repay it, but has no intention of doing so. If this were a universal law--that is, if everyone behaved this way--promises would be meaningless, and no one would lend money to anyone.
In his aesthetic theory, Kant holds that judgments that ascribe beauty to something, although they rest on feeling, do have a claim to validity and are not merely statements of taste or opinion. When a person judges something to be beautiful, imagination, perception, and understanding are in harmony; there is a harmony of the experienced object with mental structure. The concepts involved in such judgments are purpose and purposiveness.
Influence
Kant called his radical redefinition of philosophic problems and procedures a "Copernican Revolution" in philosophy. As Copernicus had reversed the way subsequent scientists thought about the relationship of the Earth and the Sun, so Kant reversed the way subsequent philosophers thought about the relationship of the world of experience and the mind. The mind is not shaped by the world of experience; rather the world of experience is shaped by the patterns set by the mind. Kant's influence and his stature as a philosopher can be measured by the fact that, since Kant, few have been able to philosophize without taking his work into account. His philosophy was the spring from which German IDEALISM flowed. The works of Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Wilhelm von Schelling, Arthur Schopenhauer, G. W. F. Hegel, and Ernst Cassirer were greatly influenced by Kant's philosophy. Even those who have opposed Kant's views have tended to deal with philosophical questions as he framed them.
Donald Gotterbarn
Bibliography: Ameriks, Karl, Kant's Theory of the Mind (1982); Arendt, Hannah, Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy (1982); Beck, Lewis White, Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason (1960; repr. 1984), Essays on Kant and Hume (1978), and Studies in the Philosophy of Kant (1965; repr. 1981); Broad, C. D., Kant: An Introduction, ed. by C. Lewy (1978); Cassirer, H. W., Kant's First Critique: An Appraisal of the Significance of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1954; repr. 1978) and Kant's Life and Thought (1981); Delaeuze, Gilles, Kant's Critical Philosophy, trans. by B. Habberjam and H. Tomlinson (1985); Ewing, Alfred C., Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, 2d ed. (1967; repr. 1987); Findlay, Joan, Kant and the Transcendental Object (1981); Galston, William A., Kant and the Problem of History (1965); Goldman, Alan H., Moral Knowledge (1989); Goldman, Lucien, Immanuel Kant (1972); Guyer, Paul, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge (1987); Heidegger, Martin, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. by James S. Churchill (1962); Jaspers, Karl, Kant (1966); Kitcher, Patricia, Kant's Transcendental Psychology (1990); Korner, Stephan, Kant (1975); Schlipp, Paul A., Kant's Pre-Critical Ethics, 2d ed., ed. by Lewis W. Beck (1960; repr. 1977); Strawson, P. F., The Bounds of Sense (1966); Wilkerson, T. E., Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: A Commentary for Students (1976); Wolff, Robert P., ed., Kant: A Collection of Critical Essays (1968); Yovel, Y., Kant and the Philosophy of History (1989)

Saludos cordiales,
Eddie R.

[Suki]

Eddie,
Kant's categorizations are very interesting. And they make me wonder. About so much. Again HL wants to talk to me about him (he is filled with questions), and I promised I would have an intellectual exchange with him about Kant. Your post here was an excellent summary. The clincher for me was a good person acts out of duty. Not reward or punishment. That is the definition of moral character in my opinion. You are definitely a man of duty.

I have a series of questions coming if not this weekend then next week. Sometimes I wish I had ICQ with you again. But I accept whatever parameters you wish. I will never forget you Senor Eddie.

Suki

[Suki]

I finished the Kant questions. I am willing to start the categories of reason analysis. Before I do, (are you allright Eddier1)? I hope you are allright. It is cold in the East coast, and you do say your joints hurt....and you have not posted for a few days. I am getting concerned. I don't know where you live or anything. No way of checking on you, except on this forum. I am totally incompetent with computers and could not hack or crack into a paper bag, much less a computer. But, you are worrying me if you don't post soon. I hope I don't sound unduly concerned. I am thinking you might got a cold or a flu or pneumonia or slipped and fell, or a mugger got you on your way back from the Donut shop or the store....or you are ill and too sick to call someone....OH WHY I AM WORRYING? Eddie, probably is napping and having Cafe Latino with some Communist friends and having a great time....and I am sitting here in Colorado worrying for naught....like Letty thinks. Well, anyway, no more personal posts.

Back to Kant. I find Kants Postulates of Empirical thoughts a bit complex. Such as:

The Postulates of Empirical Thought
1. That which agrees with the formal conditions (intuition and conception) of experience, is possible.

2. That which coheres with the material conditions of experience (sensation) is real.

3. That which coherence with the real is determined according to universal conditions of experience is (exists) necessary.

This three postulates are very interesting. First Eddie, how do you see Kant's meaning with these? They are universal? Sensation is real? Intuition is mentioned? How is intuition and sensation reliable sources of universal experience and perception?

All this leaves some room for cognition and possible interpretations of reality. And if one questions it, by asking if it is necessary is that using a faculty of empirical reason? What do you think?

Suki

[Eddier1]

Originally posted by Suki
I finished the Kant questions. I am willing to start the categories of reason analysis. Before I do, (are you allright Eddier1)? I hope you are allright. It is cold in the East coast, and you do say your joints hurt....and you have not posted for a few days. I am getting concerned. I don't know where you live or anything. No way of checking on you, except on this forum. I am totally incompetent with computers and could not hack or crack into a paper bag, much less a computer. But, you are worrying me if you don't post soon. I hope I don't sound unduly concerned. I am thinking you might got a cold or a flu or pneumonia or slipped and fell, or a mugger got you on your way back from the Donut shop or the store....or you are ill and too sick to call someone....OH WHY I AM WORRYING? Eddie, probably is napping and having Cafe Latino with some Communist friends and having a great time....and I am sitting here in Colorado worrying for naught....like Letty thinks. Well, anyway, no more personal posts.

Back to Kant. I find Kants Postulates of Empirical thoughts a bit complex. Such as:

The Postulates of Empirical Thought
1. That which agrees with the formal conditions (intuition and conception) of experience, is possible.

2. That which coheres with the material conditions of experience (sensation) is real.

3. That which coherence with the real is determined according to universal conditions of experience is (exists) necessary.

This three postulates are very interesting. First Eddie, how do you see Kant's meaning with these? They are universal? Sensation is real? Intuition is mentioned? How is intuition and sensation reliable sources of universal experience and perception?

All this leaves some room for cognition and possible interpretations of reality. And if one questions it, by asking if it is necessary is that using a faculty of empirical reason? What do you think?

Suki

First, let me thank you very much for your 'concern'. I have been alright, and reading the posts on this forum and others. And I have not been posting, because I am involved on other forums, too, and have been in discussion and posting lots there also.

Now, as to your questions: perhaps I can assign some clues which are updates in modern philosophical parlance to the key ideas which Kant has. The first question you ask refers to the categories of reason (which you say you haven't read about yet). But here is the clue to that key part of his philosophy. It is in modern terms equivalent to what is termed frames of reference or precisely 'templates in the mind that have no content'. They are merely organizational "tools" of the mind which by descriptions provide possible knowledge.

Second clue: the modern terms which applies to that is 'sense data' which is obtained in a real encounter with the empirical world by an acquaintance with the sense data we recieve through are sensory capabilities of taste, hearing, seeing, etc.. This can be called in modern terms a knowledge by acquaintance.

Third clue: What coheres with the 'real' as universal and necessary in experience exists in the world of civil society in the key term which Kant calls 'duty'. The clue to that is 'public agreement by a communal consensus of those whom are proved to be experts in the field of ethics'.

One thing more which will probably stimulate more questions from you is when you get to read what Kant writes about aesthetics. You who love music and the arts so much will probably be more moved by that 'artistic taste' that you got than by the empirical reason you use to question or even criticize what Kant has written in his "Critique of Pure Reason", and I am sure that given your subjective solipcism that it would be quite acceptable.

Saludos Cordiales,
Eddie R.

[Suki]

Eddier1,
Well you were right about me generating more questions about what the Critique of Pure Reason does. It does generate more questions. So the senses do provide a way of interpreting the world that is predictable and reliable. And yes, we all have common or universal experiences with that. Our a priori knowledge. How about the posteriori knowledge? I did finish reading Kant. And yes, his terminology is old fashioned. It is expected.

Do you think there is any hope for what you have stated I am, "a subjective solipicist" to become primarily an objectivist? Lol. Or do you think my subjectivism has no remedy? Lol. Oh, Eddier1. I truly want to become as objective as possible in philosophy. I can keep my aesthetic loves and still be a good objectivist? Don't you think?

Anyway, ethics are a very important determinant to establish a civilized society that functions. Yet, many religionists believe that morality and ethics can only be valid if religion is involved. Of course I don't agree with this thought. But in the past I have encountered so many people that think Atheists and or agnostics or non-believers are immoral or unethical because they don't believe in a higher power than themselves. Are humanists or humanistic or centric and as such believe in fallible man who is corrupt and sinful and as such there is a moral breakdown in any government or society that lacks religious influences. With the descriptives of judgement and of what is duty and obligation and social consciousness that theory or thought is invalid. Ethics and morality and social responsibility does not need organized religion to be coherent and functional and to have proper social implementation and cohesion within society. I got the Jehova Witnesses knocking on my door every Saturday. I got Roman Catholics knocking on my door too, and Baptists as well. They are all convinced that if their church denomination did not exist there would be people running around with no moral sense if it weren't institutionalized and contained within the codes of religious doctrine.

Human societies on a social level always have ethics and rules of conduct that is usually appropriate for all members and the natural environment in which the society resides in. History plays a part of that as well. I wish I brought my Kant book with me and my notebook with the questions. I left it at home. I can't get pr.com at home. So therefore can't write or post there. But I do remember a question. Eddie, people over many eons of time have always had disputes over territories and resources, in your opinion and based on Kantian thought and dialectical materialism how would one go about distributing these resources equitably without resorting to violence or force? Any society can use military technology and force and terror to try to gain the upper hand in territorial disputes but that is not ethical. But it is done all the time. And has been present in human nation states behavior for a long time....Ofcourse international regulatory agencies are there to prevent that...but how effective is that? Look at WWII. Trying to contain German hegemonic impositions? I don't know if dialectical materialism would have an ultimate answer for territorial disputes. Right to defend oneself or nation ofcourse. Do you think Trotsky wanting to spread the revolution to many other nations was part of the irreconcilable split with Lenin? His irrealistic thoughts on exporting revolutions outside national boundaries...among other points of difference? I am just wondering.

Now with Kant, if one can't experience something not based on materially or externally validated knowledge does that mean it does not exist? Or that it might exist but since we are not capable of percieving it or gaining concrete measurable knowledge of it, it is relegated to the unknowable? I know you have thought about this deeply and have an answer....may I also say, I was glad when I read you were just posting somewhere else for a while and were just fine. And don't be so hard on me....with the subjectivist. I mean really Eddie, just how objective is the average person? With so many as you say 'evil shenanigans' going on with capitalistic subliminal messages, and manipulations of emotion for profit going on? One has to deprogram and reconstruct a whole new society with different motivations...you truly need a revolution to do that. Religion is a major source of brainwashing...but it also a powerful and organized form of societal control and ritual and ceremony and all the cultural implications that comes with it...is pretty much universal Eddie within so many different cultures all over the world. Hunter-gatherers, farmers, agricultural and pastoral cultures and also within capitalism (religions) have become another means of making or generating profit and also to retain community traditions such as volunteer service, and community service and work and projects. It is an ingrained way of organizing society.

If this human need for ritual and extra sensoral and extra empirical myth making were not necessary or not part of the social psychology or consciousness then why does it continue to crop up all the time? I know it might be due to the needs of those people to engage in opiates. Lol. But that is hard to eradicate....that prohibition 'dry laws' in the USA in the 1930's were dismal failures. Prohibiting opiates with ingrained traditions and so on...usually are. Unless there is hard work and communal agreement on its eradication...no se. I would love to see how the critique of judgement can be fomented to create more independent thinkers within capitalism too.

Muchos saludos muy calidos,
Suki.

[Suki]

You know when I wrote a piece on La Celestina a long time ago....for Spanish lit class....I thought hard on what a theocratic society is....and why scientific thought was so repressed and persecuted. And how the church became a powerful institution with land, properties and hiearchy. Social structure. Organized with certain goals. Again the paralells between political organizations and religious ones have some things in common.

Politics is a dirty business true Eddie. And religious fanaticism also is a dirty business. Both use emotional tendencies in people to create fear of change and fear of questioning the old status quo. They want to preserve and perpetuate themselves. Thus the incessant asking for taxes (for the state to exist) and the tithe or offering to the church (the collection plate). But if the state and the church are corrupt they are both detrimental to the majority of the society aren't they? They become these monstrous machines who seek out all who oppose them and bring them pain and death. At least in its undeveloped and imperialistic form. But I do think through constant experiences based on empirical life---and that includes now Kantian thought and philosophy, that human beings learn through their historical and socioeconomic mistakes and evolve socially as well. We do. No denying that. To err is human. That is true. But to adapt and grow and create better systems is also very human. Of that I have no doubts.

May I be a subjectivist once again and say how very lovely it is to read a post of yours in philosophy. It does appeal to my aesthetic side....it always has. You do have an aesthetic side to you too Eddie. It is quite obvious.

Suki

[Eddier1]

Suki, too many things at one time, you have posted in your two latest. But, since I am pressed for time, what with deciding on a menu for dinner, etc. I will try to address what I can recall about the lots.

First, you ask about your feelings that I am being "hard" on you for being a subjectivist. I don't see me being "hard" on you for that at all. Hey, if you read more in the History of Ideas about Philosophy, you will discover that subjective idealism, also termed solipscism, is a valid philosophical idea. It was George Berkley, an English philosopher of a few centuries ago, who was the first philosopher to address subjectivism in a methodical and philosophical manner. Read him, and I think you will never ask anyone "permission" to be a subjectivist.

One thing more, and I will try to return later to make 'heads or tails' out of some of the other extraneous topics you have mentionsed in the posts.

The question of apostoriori propositions being knowledge. Well, I think that was what Kant made the main question of his Critique when he asked "How are synthetic apriori propositions possible?". To answer that question without peradventure of a doubt, is not possible, but I would say that in the empirical world, the sense data that we obtain through knowledge by aquaintanceship with the sense data makes it more than possible, but also probable.

It is a real encounter with the empirical world. On the other hand, and here is where "doubt" sneaks into the picture, the knowledge by description we achieve through the patterns of thought, i.e., the categories of reason of quality, quantity, relation, and modality, all of them merely 'templates' in the brain (probably through DNA code switching) never gives the mind apodictic certitude about the real world. Hence, doubt that what we see in the patch of our brains concerning the external world enters into the thought-process, and we can never be sure that the empirical world is actually the way our patterns or categories of reason have organized the content of our sense data. Therefore, we can never say 'for sure' that the external world is identical to the way we think about it.

Perhaps, that has much to do with me being a dialectical empiricist and/or materialist, and not a Kantian nor a neo-Kantian. However, as I must dash at the moment, I will return to the plethora of other things that you have packed into your two posts.

Till later...